Saturday 31 May 2014

David Harold Eastman/ Commonwealth Ombudsman / Veronique Ingram/ Guilty till proven inocent
So David Eastman worked for Treasury. If I recall correctly he had made complaints about treasury to the Australian Public Service and I think the Ombudsman. 
So how much did the court rely on the  the circumstantial evidence of people who claimed  Eastman told them he was going to kill the Commonwealth Ombudsman and applying the "Reasonable Persons'  Test did a reasonable person think this was possible  or he had the actual ability or in all accounts  was it merely a FIGURE of speech?
So what was David Eastman complaining about to these authorities?
Is also interesting that the shonky Veronique Ingram   Inspector General in Bankruptcy  who is currently protecting atrocious systemic corrupt conduct at ITSA or Afsa also worked for treasury.
There is an approximately 14 years difference between Eastman and Ingram so it is unclear if their  paths crossed!!!!
Was this all part of some conspiracy by the Federal Police to silence Eastman because of his complaints that had foundation??



It is now more than 25 years since Australian Federal Police Commissioner Colin Stanley Winchester was shot and killed as he arrived home from work at 9.15 pm on Tuesday 10 January 1989.
After a protracted police investigation and a trial that lasted 85 days, David Harold Eastman (now aged 69), was convicted of the murder in 1995.
The body of evidence was significant. Amongst it, revelations that ammunition residue found in the boot of Eastman’s car was indistinguishable from that found at the murder scene.
But the circumstantial evidence was also compelling. Several prominent people had come forward after the killing saying Eastman had told them he was going to kill Winchester (as well as a threat to kill the Commonwealth Ombudsman).
Eastman reportedly told Winchester this to his face because he would not withdraw an assault charge against him. A witness saw him staking out Winchester’s Deakin home in days prior to the shooting. The witness recalled the make and colour of car, but had the last digit wrong [the rest correct] from the number plate.
The jury was unanimous in finding him guilty and he was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole by ACT Supreme Court Justice Ken Carruthers. This by and large should have been the end of the matter and the last we see of Eastman.
The exhaustive trial had given plenty of opportunity for the evidence to be publicly reported and room for speculation. Almost from the time of the investigation and arrest it was clear Eastman was a serial nuisance, a dangerous public pest and a combative and violent individual.
He regularly had blow-ups with various government agency staff members (gathering more than 200 alleged assault reports). He fought with his lawyers and sacked his defence team on any number of occasions.
Eastman, who is occasionally painted as ‘highly intelligent’ by the Fairfax media, simply had no other case to make – or surely he would have done so. He would not or could not say where he was on the night of the murder. And he could not – or would not – explain other evidence presented to the court.
Possibly out of this genesis grew a thread of doubt that he might be a victim of a miss-trial. Police pressure could have sent him over the top and prevented him from presenting a rational defence.
These arguments gained some credence as the years passed and as the murder event recedes from memory and as police and key players age and move on in their lives.
A small group of anonymous supporters has spent the years arguing Eastman’s cause from behind the scenes. It has brought forward doubts that evidence might be flawed (or even fabricated) and/or given undue (or unfair) weight. The Fairfax media in particular has given a mostly sympathetic voice for the Eastman cause, and it has nurtured the idea that he may well (despite everything) be an innocent man.
On 3 September 2012 this background chorus of support paid off for Eastman when the Hon Justice Shane Marshall ordered an Inquiry into the conviction. The inquiry has now completed its hearings (on 15 May 2014).  The inquiry has its own Eastman Inquiry website.
Many readers of Fairfax newspapers were not born when Winchester was gunned down 25 years ago. They can be forgiven for giving credence to the long-running counter-argument that a Mafia hit man gunned the commissioner down as pay-back for a bungled marijuana deal.
It is difficult to imagine what this process has cost the public purse.  The investigation and court case alone lasted around five years. Since then his cause has re-emerged time and again, driven by a handful of well-meaning but more possibly misguided supporters.
Postscript: To obtain further insights read Justice Michael Adams sues over evidence claim (The Australian 7 June 2013). Justice Adam’s claim has not been reported in the Fairfax media.

Monday 3 March 2014

Commonwealth Director of Prosecution considering how to protect Fraud and corruption in Government Departments

From: Stephen.Grodzicki@cdpp.gov.au
To: fionabrown01@hotmail.com
Subject: RE: REASONABLE PEOPLE S474.17 [DLM=Sensitive:Legal]
Date: Mon, 3 Mar 2014 05:38:41 +0000

Sensitive: Legal
Dear Ms Brown,

I am not permitted to give you any legal advice about the meaning of “reasonable persons”.

I advise that I will be seeking an adjournment at the call over tomorrow until Friday 7.3.14, to carefully consider whether these charges ought to proceed further.

Many thanks,


Stephen Grodzicki
A/ Principal Legal Officer | Prosecutions (3)
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, Sydney Office
T: 02 9321 1111 | F: 9321 1351 | E: Stephen.Grodzicki@cdpp.gov.aup

Saturday 11 January 2014

NO CASE TO ANSWER.......................................
No case answer refers to a submission made by a defendant or accused in a court, which states that the claim or prosecution is not sufficient for conviction or judgment. The defendant supports his/her submission by pleading that that the case is based on insufficient legal grounds or insufficient factual evidence. A successful no case submission results in the end of a trial and release of the defendant.
No case to answer is heard after prosecution evidence and arguments. In this submission, the accused asks the judge to tell the jury to find that s/he is not guilty.

Home >Indictable Offences >Trials - Indictable Offences No case to answer
When all the witnesses for the prosecution have been heard and the prosecution case has closed, the accused can submit to the judge that there is no case to answer. The jury are not in the courtroom when this is done. In this submission, the accused asks the judge to tell the jury to find the accused not guilty without even hearing from the accused, on the basis that the prosecution has not produced sufficient evidence to support the charge. If the judge agrees, the jury come back into the courtroom and the judge then directs the jury to bring in a not guilty verdict and the jury must do so. The case is then finished. If the judge does not agree, the accused must present her or his case to the jury. - See more at: http://www.lawhandbook.sa.gov.au/ch13s03s06s05.php#sthash.HBwIqJW5.dpuf

5.7.1 - No Case to Answer


  1. At the end of the prosecution case, the defence may submit to the judge that there is no case for the accused to answer (CPA 2009 s226).
  2. The test for a "no-case" submission is well established:
    [I]f there is evidence (even if tenuous or inherently weak or vague) which can be taken into account by the jury in its deliberations and that evidence is capable of supporting a verdict of guilty, the matter must be left to the jury for its decision. Or, to put the matter in more usual terms, a verdict of not guilty may be directed only if there is a defect in the evidence such that, taken at its highest, it will not sustain a verdict of guilty (Doney v R (1990) 171 CLR 207).
  3. A judge assesses a "no-case" submission by taking the prosecution evidence (including the answers of prosecution witnesses to cross-examination) at its highest and by drawing all inferences that are the most favourable to the prosecution case that are reasonably open (Attorney-General’s Reference (No 1 of 1983) [1983] 2 VR 410; Case Stated by DPP (No 2 of 1993) (1993) 70 A Crim R 323; R v Galbraith [1981] 2 All ER 1060).
  4. The weight of evidence is purely a question for the jury. The judge is not called upon to determine whether he or she thinks that the accused should be convicted. The test is whether, as a question of law, a jury could lawfully find the accused guilty (May v O’Sullivan (1955) 92 CLR 654; Zanetti v Hill (1962) 108 CLR 433).
  5. The judge must assume that the jury will accept the prosecution witnesses as credible and reliable. The assessment of witnesses is a matter for the jury and where, on one view of the evidence, the evidence demonstrates the accused’s guilt, a "no-case" submission must be rejected (Attorney-General’s Reference (No 1 of 1983) [1983] 2 VR 410; R v Galbraith [1981] 2 All ER 1060).
  6. The judge does not need to consider evidence that contradicts, qualifies or explains the prosecution’s case or that supports the accused’s case (R v R (1989) 18 NSWLR 74).
  7. The test for a "no-case" submission is different to the test on appeal for whether a verdict is "unsafe or unsatisfactory". A judge on a "no case" submission must apply the test stated above and may not uphold the submission on the basis that any conviction is likely to be overturned on appeal as unsafe and unsatisfactory (Doney v R (1990) 171 CLR 207; Attorney-General’s Reference (No 1 of 1983) [1983] 2 VR 410; c.f. M v R (1994) 181 CLR 487).
  8. Courts on appeal will not inquire into the correctness of a decision on a "no-case" submission. The court will instead consider the whole of the evidence to determine whether the conviction was unsafe or unsatisfactory. This will include any evidence led by the accused in his or her defence. The court is not limited to deciding whether the evidence that was available at the close of the prosecution case was sufficient to support the verdict (R v Wood [1974] VR 117; R v Vasic (2005) 11 VR 380; R v Barclay, Unreported, VSC CCA, 13 February 1985).

Monday 6 January 2014

ANAO Better practice Guide

  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Leadership and Culture
  • 3. Legislation, Policy and Governance
  • 4. Fraud Control Strategies—Overview
  • 5. Fraud Control—Prevention
  • 6. Fraud Control—Detection
  • 7. Fraud Control—Response
  • 8. Fraud Control—Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting
  • 9. Identity Fraud—an Emerging Fraud Risk
  • Case Studies
  • Appendices
  • Quick reference card




  • 7.1. Fraud investigation

    The purpose of a fraud investigation is to gather evidence relating to specific fraud allegations to determine the facts relating to the matter and to assist in deciding what, if any, action should be taken in relation to the matter(s). Under the Fraud Control Guidelines, relevant entities are required to investigate routine or minor instances of fraud against entity programs and to document the reasons for their decisions, irrespective of whether the initial assessment results in the matter being referred for a criminal investigation. ‘Routine or minor’ is defined as instances of fraud that, on an initial assessment by the entity, would be unlikely to be accepted by the Australian Federal Police (AFP) under its Case Categorisation and Prioritisation Model (see section 7.1.1).
    Because the investigation process must give due consideration to a broad range of legislative, policy and practical considerations, such as sufficient evidence to support the prosecution of a criminal charge in a court of law,relevent entities must have regard to the Fraud Control Guidelines and the AGIS, which provide guidance on appropriate investigation competency standards for Commonwealth employees and investigation service providers.

    7.1.1. AFP referrals and assistance

    The Fraud Control Guidelines stipulate that the AFP has primary responsibility for investigating serious or complex fraud against the Commonwealth. Relevant entities must refer all instances of potential serious or complex fraud offences to the AFP in accordance with the AGIS and AFP referral process published on the AFP’s website.[46] The AFP will review the referral in line with the AFP Case Categorisation and Prioritisation Model and may subsequently undertake an investigation into the matter, or reject the referral, undertake a joint investigation with the entity.
    Under the Fraud Control Guidelines, relevant entities that have the capacity and the appropriate skills and resources needed to investigate criminal matters and meet the requirements of the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (CDPP) in gathering evidence and preparing briefs of evidence are authorised to investigate serious or complex offences against the Commonwealth.
    Entities can request AFP assistance or advice in relation to an investigation being conducted by that entity into a suspected fraud matter. The AFP can assist entities with the conduct of search warrants, and can provide the following services to support an investigation:
    • forensic services;
    • document examination;
    • fingerprint analysis;
    • DNA;
    • ballistic testing; and
    • computer forensics.
    Under the Fraud Control Guidelines, relevant entities that have the capacity and the appropriate skills and resources needed to investigate criminal matters and meet the requirements of the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (CDPP) in gathering evidence and preparing briefs of evidence are authorised to investigate serious or complex offences against the Commonwealth.

    7.1.2. Australian Government Investigations Standards

    All Australian Government entities that are required to comply with the Fraud Control Guidelines must also comply with the minimum standards for investigations set out in the Australian Government Investigations Standards (AGIS).[47] The AGIS establishes the minimum standards for relevant Australian government entities when they conduct investigations. Should the AGIS be in conflict with legislation, the legislative requirement prevails.
    An investigation is a project seeking information relevant to an alleged, apparent or potential breach of the law. The primary purpose of an investigation is to gather admissible evidence for any subsequent action, whether under criminal, civil penalty, civil, disciplinary or administrative sanctions. Investigations can also result in disruption or prevention action being taken by entities.
    The AGIS is applicable to investigations where an entity determines there are reasonable grounds to suspect non-compliance, involve a conflict of interest or if the seriousness or complexity of the matter requires application of these standards. The term ‘investigation’ can also include intelligence processes which directly support the gathering of admissible evidence. The AGIS applies to all stages of an investigation.
    According to the AGIS, the outcome of an investigation does not distinguish between administrative, criminal or civil action and is not a factor in determining the quality of the investigation. Rather, what is important are the standards applied during an investigation and the capacity of the investigative process to withstand administrative, operational and judicial review.
    Relevant entities are required to comply with the AGIS to achieve a uniformly high standard of investigation by:
    • having up-to-date policies and procedures relevant to their functions and programs and an investigation management system, and file management and activity recording procedures in place;
    • complying with the AGIS definition of an investigation and the related primary purpose for gathering admissible evidence for subsequent action;
    • documenting their policies and procedures for handling all aspects of the investigation process consistent with the AGIS, from initial consideration of an allegation through to successful prosecution of fraudulent crime and recovery of criminal proceeds; and
    • clearly identifying the different investigation methodologies for administrative and criminal investigations and the decision-making in relation to the transition from regulatory / compliance functions to criminal investigation.

    7.1.3. Identification of fraudulent behaviour

    The Fraud Control Guidelines require relevant entities to have information systems in place, appropriate for the number and complexity of investigations undertaken, in order to manage information gathered about fraud. This not only supports sound decision-making at the management level, but also helps entities to identify and address any systemic issues that are relevant to fraud.
    It is good practice for an organisation to record every allegation of fraudulent conduct that is reported to it, preferably in a central database. This enables proactive analysis of potential fraud hot spots and it can be used to direct the activities of internal audit. A central database also enables trends and analysis of fraud types to be undertaken and profiles to be developed based on systemic types of fraud cases.
    According to the Australian Standard AS 8001-2008 Fraud and Corruption Control, a fraud incident register should include:
    • date and time of report;
    • date and time of incident detection;
    • how the incident was reported to management (anonymous report, line management etc);
    • nature of the incident;
    • value of the loss to the entity (if any); and
    • action taken following detection.
    Such a register can be used to facilitate an organisation’s policy for the reporting, analysis and escalation of all detected incidences of fraud and corruption. This policy should be clear on the actions to be undertaken following the reporting of an incident.

    Case Study

    FaHCSIA fraud response governance model

    The Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (FaHCSIA) recently established a working group between its Fraud and Compliance Branch and People Branch. The working group meets on a weekly basis to discuss allegations of ‘unethical conduct’, particularly in relation to fraud matters. The working group aims to ensure that all allegations are investigated by the most appropriate party within FaHCSIA to enable the best outcome for the department.
    The working group also allows the two branches to identify and discuss potential hot spots and analyse trends with a view to improving education and awareness-raising for employees in the department. The two branches have also developed a complementary suite of reports in relation to matters that are considered by FaHCSIA’s Compliance and Integrity Committee.

    7.1.4. Preliminary case assessment of an allegation of fraud

    The AGIS outlines the standards required of relevant entities when receiving and dealing with an allegation of fraud and all investigations are to be conducted in accordance with the AGIS. Upon receiving an allegation of fraudulent conduct, a relevant entity needs to consider what should be the appropriate response.
    Under the AGIS, a relevant entity must have a procedure covering the initial consideration of a fraud allegation that includes:
    • recording of the allegation in an appropriately secure fraud incident register, file and/or electronic case management system, consistent with the Australian Government Protective Security Policy Framework;
    • the person responsible for making the initial assessment (the decision-maker) is appropriately trained, as required by the Fraud Control Guidelines, and the entity provides an appropriate level of managerial oversight of decision-making;
    • timeframes for initial consideration of the allegation;
    • the obtaining of any readily accessible evidentiary information from within the entity, where the collection of such evidence would not jeopardise any future investigation, to allow an informed decision on the type of further action required; and
    • the need to document the reasons for the decision and what action is intended. The decision as to how to respond to an allegation of fraud is considered to be a ‘critical decision’ in the fraud investigation process and one which needs to be appropriately documented.[48]
    An entity may also make use of a Case Categorisation and Prioritisation Model (CCPM). This tool aids the decision-maker in making the initial assessment and helps drive transparency and consistency in decision-making. The AFP utilises a CCPM for matters referred from other organisations, and entities can consider adapting the principles in this model for their own decision-making purposes.
    As provided under the AGIS, it may be that a preliminary inquiry, or ‘case assessment’, is required before a decision can be made as to how to proceed with the allegation. An initial case assessment is aimed at gaining sufficient information to be able to determine the subsequent appropriate action and could include: an interview of the complainant; some level of financial analysis to identify the potential veracity of the allegation; and such other preliminary steps as necessary to enable the decision to be made.
    Relevant entities should ensure that in undertaking any preliminary inquiry, they comply with the AGIS and any entity direction or protocols relating to the handling of allegations of fraud, including those relating to the use of coercive powers to collect evidence. Agencies need to provide clear guidance to their investigators about the use of coercive powers particularly once fraudulent behaviour is suspected and the investigation becomes a criminal investigation.
    It should also be noted that, irrespective of whether the decision is made to undertake a criminal or disciplinary investigation, the AGIS standards of investigation must be maintained to allow for the possibility of the allegation becoming more appropriate for criminal investigation. As such, relevent entities must have regard to the Fraud Control Guidelines and the AGIS, which provide guidance on appropriate investigation competency standards for Commonwealth employees and investigation service providers. (see section 7.1.6).

    7.1.5. Conducting an investigation

    Fraud investigations are conducted to determine the facts relating to specific allegations of fraud, through the collection and examination of evidence. The AGIS provides guidance and better practice investigation and case management standards for all investigations. Relevant entities must have in place processes and procedures that are consistent with, or exceed, the model procedures outlined in the AGIS modules.[49]
    For example, relevant entities must have written procedures regarding:
    • the process for taking witness statements and conducting interviews with suspects;
    • the handling of all physical evidence, including property seizure records, and the storage and disposal of exhibits (there should also be written procedures addressing the audit of the exhibit register as required by the Australian Government Protective Security Policy Framework);
    • the conduct of surveillance, including physical and electronic;
    • the management of human information sources (also referred to as informants); and
    • the use of legislated powers such as the power of arrest, detention, coercion, search warrant execution, production orders and inspection orders.
    Investigators must have knowledge of and the ability to apply the principles and elements of their entity’s standards and written procedures.
    A fraud investigation and response decision-making process is represented at Figure 7.1. This decision tree has been developed to provide an explanation of, and guidance through, the fraud investigation and response process.
    This diagram should not be used as a substitute for the AGIS but rather as a guide to better understand the critical decisions that need to be made and documented, from the initial assessment of the allegation and throughout the fraud investigation and response process.

    Outsourcing investigations

    In some instances, relevant entities will not be sufficiently resourced to conduct an internal investigative response to allegations of fraud. The establishment of an internal fraud investigations team can be costly and takes time to implement effectively. This will not be an issue for the larger program delivery and customer service entities, but for smaller entities (or entities which traditionally focus on policy development), the most cost-effective option will be to engage external investigations services.
    In outsourcing investigation activities, relevant entities must take into account the Fraud Control Guidelines and the AGIS, which provide guidance on appropriate investigation competency standards for investigation service providers (see section 7.1.6). It is also beneficial if providers have demonstrated experience in conducting fraud investigations in an Australian government context, and are sufficiently familiar with the requirements of the Fraud Control Guidelines and the AGIS.
    Notwithstanding an entity’s resource constraints with respect to internal fraud response capabilities, all serious and complex fraud matters should be referred to the AFP in the first instance. In addition, a relevant entity must consider whether it may still require support from the AFP in the form of assistance to execute search warrants or in the provision of forensic services (see section 7.1.1).
    Figure 7.1: Fraud investigation and response decision tree
    Figure 7.1: Fraud investigation and response decision treeSource: KPMG.
    [Click image above to open larger version in a new window

    7.1.6. Training requirements

    In deciding to undertake a fraud investigation, relevant entities must have regard to the Fraud Control Guidelines and the AGIS, which provide guidance on appropriate investigation competency standards for Commonwealth employees and investigation service providers.
    The Public Services Training Package PSP04 offers the following qualifications relevant to fraud investigations:
    • a Certificate IV in Government (Investigation) for employees or contractors primarily engaged in the investigation of fraud; and
    • a Diploma of Government (Investigation) for employees contractors primarily engaged in the coordination and conduct of fraud control investigations.
    In addition to appropriate qualifications, a robust internal investigations team should have a good mix of skills and experience. Depending on the needs of the entity an investigations team could include: ex-law enforcement officers; lawyers; intelligence operatives; forensic accountants; Information Technology experts, and subject matter experts for the types of programs and services delivered by the entity (for example, building surveyors, engineers or social workers).
    .










    Image: Thumbnail of Report Cover
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Leadership and Culture
  • 3. Legislation, Policy and Governance
  • 4. Fraud Control Strategies—Overview
  • 5. Fraud Control—Prevention
  • 6. Fraud Control—Detection
  • 7. Fraud Control—Response
  • 8. Fraud Control—Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting
  • 9. Identity Fraud—an Emerging Fraud Risk
  • Case Studies
  • Appendices
  • Quick reference card




  • 7.1. Fraud investigation

    The purpose of a fraud investigation is to gather evidence relating to specific fraud allegations to determine the facts relating to the matter and to assist in deciding what, if any, action should be taken in relation to the matter(s). Under the Fraud Control Guidelines, relevant entities are required to investigate routine or minor instances of fraud against entity programs and to document the reasons for their decisions, irrespective of whether the initial assessment results in the matter being referred for a criminal investigation. ‘Routine or minor’ is defined as instances of fraud that, on an initial assessment by the entity, would be unlikely to be accepted by the Australian Federal Police (AFP) under its Case Categorisation and Prioritisation Model (see section 7.1.1).
    Because the investigation process must give due consideration to a broad range of legislative, policy and practical considerations, such as sufficient evidence to support the prosecution of a criminal charge in a court of law,relevent entities must have regard to the Fraud Control Guidelines and the AGIS, which provide guidance on appropriate investigation competency standards for Commonwealth employees and investigation service providers.

    7.1.1. AFP referrals and assistance

    The Fraud Control Guidelines stipulate that the AFP has primary responsibility for investigating serious or complex fraud against the Commonwealth. Relevant entities must refer all instances of potential serious or complex fraud offences to the AFP in accordance with the AGIS and AFP referral process published on the AFP’s website.[46] The AFP will review the referral in line with the AFP Case Categorisation and Prioritisation Model and may subsequently undertake an investigation into the matter, or reject the referral, undertake a joint investigation with the entity.
    Under the Fraud Control Guidelines, relevant entities that have the capacity and the appropriate skills and resources needed to investigate criminal matters and meet the requirements of the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (CDPP) in gathering evidence and preparing briefs of evidence are authorised to investigate serious or complex offences against the Commonwealth.
    Entities can request AFP assistance or advice in relation to an investigation being conducted by that entity into a suspected fraud matter. The AFP can assist entities with the conduct of search warrants, and can provide the following services to support an investigation:
    • forensic services;
    • document examination;
    • fingerprint analysis;
    • DNA;
    • ballistic testing; and
    • computer forensics.
    Under the Fraud Control Guidelines, relevant entities that have the capacity and the appropriate skills and resources needed to investigate criminal matters and meet the requirements of the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (CDPP) in gathering evidence and preparing briefs of evidence are authorised to investigate serious or complex offences against the Commonwealth.

    7.1.2. Australian Government Investigations Standards

    All Australian Government entities that are required to comply with the Fraud Control Guidelines must also comply with the minimum standards for investigations set out in the Australian Government Investigations Standards (AGIS).[47] The AGIS establishes the minimum standards for relevant Australian government entities when they conduct investigations. Should the AGIS be in conflict with legislation, the legislative requirement prevails.
    An investigation is a project seeking information relevant to an alleged, apparent or potential breach of the law. The primary purpose of an investigation is to gather admissible evidence for any subsequent action, whether under criminal, civil penalty, civil, disciplinary or administrative sanctions. Investigations can also result in disruption or prevention action being taken by entities.
    The AGIS is applicable to investigations where an entity determines there are reasonable grounds to suspect non-compliance, involve a conflict of interest or if the seriousness or complexity of the matter requires application of these standards. The term ‘investigation’ can also include intelligence processes which directly support the gathering of admissible evidence. The AGIS applies to all stages of an investigation.
    According to the AGIS, the outcome of an investigation does not distinguish between administrative, criminal or civil action and is not a factor in determining the quality of the investigation. Rather, what is important are the standards applied during an investigation and the capacity of the investigative process to withstand administrative, operational and judicial review.
    Relevant entities are required to comply with the AGIS to achieve a uniformly high standard of investigation by:
    • having up-to-date policies and procedures relevant to their functions and programs and an investigation management system, and file management and activity recording procedures in place;
    • complying with the AGIS definition of an investigation and the related primary purpose for gathering admissible evidence for subsequent action;
    • documenting their policies and procedures for handling all aspects of the investigation process consistent with the AGIS, from initial consideration of an allegation through to successful prosecution of fraudulent crime and recovery of criminal proceeds; and
    • clearly identifying the different investigation methodologies for administrative and criminal investigations and the decision-making in relation to the transition from regulatory / compliance functions to criminal investigation.

    7.1.3. Identification of fraudulent behaviour

    The Fraud Control Guidelines require relevant entities to have information systems in place, appropriate for the number and complexity of investigations undertaken, in order to manage information gathered about fraud. This not only supports sound decision-making at the management level, but also helps entities to identify and address any systemic issues that are relevant to fraud.
    It is good practice for an organisation to record every allegation of fraudulent conduct that is reported to it, preferably in a central database. This enables proactive analysis of potential fraud hot spots and it can be used to direct the activities of internal audit. A central database also enables trends and analysis of fraud types to be undertaken and profiles to be developed based on systemic types of fraud cases.
    According to the Australian Standard AS 8001-2008 Fraud and Corruption Control, a fraud incident register should include:
    • date and time of report;
    • date and time of incident detection;
    • how the incident was reported to management (anonymous report, line management etc);
    • nature of the incident;
    • value of the loss to the entity (if any); and
    • action taken following detection.
    Such a register can be used to facilitate an organisation’s policy for the reporting, analysis and escalation of all detected incidences of fraud and corruption. This policy should be clear on the actions to be undertaken following the reporting of an incident.

    Case Study

    FaHCSIA fraud response governance model

    The Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (FaHCSIA) recently established a working group between its Fraud and Compliance Branch and People Branch. The working group meets on a weekly basis to discuss allegations of ‘unethical conduct’, particularly in relation to fraud matters. The working group aims to ensure that all allegations are investigated by the most appropriate party within FaHCSIA to enable the best outcome for the department.
    The working group also allows the two branches to identify and discuss potential hot spots and analyse trends with a view to improving education and awareness-raising for employees in the department. The two branches have also developed a complementary suite of reports in relation to matters that are considered by FaHCSIA’s Compliance and Integrity Committee.

    7.1.4. Preliminary case assessment of an allegation of fraud

    The AGIS outlines the standards required of relevant entities when receiving and dealing with an allegation of fraud and all investigations are to be conducted in accordance with the AGIS. Upon receiving an allegation of fraudulent conduct, a relevant entity needs to consider what should be the appropriate response.
    Under the AGIS, a relevant entity must have a procedure covering the initial consideration of a fraud allegation that includes:
    • recording of the allegation in an appropriately secure fraud incident register, file and/or electronic case management system, consistent with the Australian Government Protective Security Policy Framework;
    • the person responsible for making the initial assessment (the decision-maker) is appropriately trained, as required by the Fraud Control Guidelines, and the entity provides an appropriate level of managerial oversight of decision-making;
    • timeframes for initial consideration of the allegation;
    • the obtaining of any readily accessible evidentiary information from within the entity, where the collection of such evidence would not jeopardise any future investigation, to allow an informed decision on the type of further action required; and
    • the need to document the reasons for the decision and what action is intended. The decision as to how to respond to an allegation of fraud is considered to be a ‘critical decision’ in the fraud investigation process and one which needs to be appropriately documented.[48]
    An entity may also make use of a Case Categorisation and Prioritisation Model (CCPM). This tool aids the decision-maker in making the initial assessment and helps drive transparency and consistency in decision-making. The AFP utilises a CCPM for matters referred from other organisations, and entities can consider adapting the principles in this model for their own decision-making purposes.
    As provided under the AGIS, it may be that a preliminary inquiry, or ‘case assessment’, is required before a decision can be made as to how to proceed with the allegation. An initial case assessment is aimed at gaining sufficient information to be able to determine the subsequent appropriate action and could include: an interview of the complainant; some level of financial analysis to identify the potential veracity of the allegation; and such other preliminary steps as necessary to enable the decision to be made.
    Relevant entities should ensure that in undertaking any preliminary inquiry, they comply with the AGIS and any entity direction or protocols relating to the handling of allegations of fraud, including those relating to the use of coercive powers to collect evidence. Agencies need to provide clear guidance to their investigators about the use of coercive powers particularly once fraudulent behaviour is suspected and the investigation becomes a criminal investigation.
    It should also be noted that, irrespective of whether the decision is made to undertake a criminal or disciplinary investigation, the AGIS standards of investigation must be maintained to allow for the possibility of the allegation becoming more appropriate for criminal investigation. As such, relevent entities must have regard to the Fraud Control Guidelines and the AGIS, which provide guidance on appropriate investigation competency standards for Commonwealth employees and investigation service providers. (see section 7.1.6).

    7.1.5. Conducting an investigation

    Fraud investigations are conducted to determine the facts relating to specific allegations of fraud, through the collection and examination of evidence. The AGIS provides guidance and better practice investigation and case management standards for all investigations. Relevant entities must have in place processes and procedures that are consistent with, or exceed, the model procedures outlined in the AGIS modules.[49]
    For example, relevant entities must have written procedures regarding:
    • the process for taking witness statements and conducting interviews with suspects;
    • the handling of all physical evidence, including property seizure records, and the storage and disposal of exhibits (there should also be written procedures addressing the audit of the exhibit register as required by the Australian Government Protective Security Policy Framework);
    • the conduct of surveillance, including physical and electronic;
    • the management of human information sources (also referred to as informants); and
    • the use of legislated powers such as the power of arrest, detention, coercion, search warrant execution, production orders and inspection orders.
    Investigators must have knowledge of and the ability to apply the principles and elements of their entity’s standards and written procedures.
    A fraud investigation and response decision-making process is represented at Figure 7.1. This decision tree has been developed to provide an explanation of, and guidance through, the fraud investigation and response process.
    This diagram should not be used as a substitute for the AGIS but rather as a guide to better understand the critical decisions that need to be made and documented, from the initial assessment of the allegation and throughout the fraud investigation and response process.

    Outsourcing investigations

    In some instances, relevant entities will not be sufficiently resourced to conduct an internal investigative response to allegations of fraud. The establishment of an internal fraud investigations team can be costly and takes time to implement effectively. This will not be an issue for the larger program delivery and customer service entities, but for smaller entities (or entities which traditionally focus on policy development), the most cost-effective option will be to engage external investigations services.
    In outsourcing investigation activities, relevant entities must take into account the Fraud Control Guidelines and the AGIS, which provide guidance on appropriate investigation competency standards for investigation service providers (see section 7.1.6). It is also beneficial if providers have demonstrated experience in conducting fraud investigations in an Australian government context, and are sufficiently familiar with the requirements of the Fraud Control Guidelines and the AGIS.
    Notwithstanding an entity’s resource constraints with respect to internal fraud response capabilities, all serious and complex fraud matters should be referred to the AFP in the first instance. In addition, a relevant entity must consider whether it may still require support from the AFP in the form of assistance to execute search warrants or in the provision of forensic services (see section 7.1.1).
    Figure 7.1: Fraud investigation and response decision tree
    Figure 7.1: Fraud investigation and response decision tree Source: KPMG.
    [Click image above to open larger version in a new window

    7.1.6. Training requirements

    In deciding to undertake a fraud investigation, relevant entities must have regard to the Fraud Control Guidelines and the AGIS, which provide guidance on appropriate investigation competency standards for Commonwealth employees and investigation service providers.
    The Public Services Training Package PSP04 offers the following qualifications relevant to fraud investigations:
    • a Certificate IV in Government (Investigation) for employees or contractors primarily engaged in the investigation of fraud; and
    • a Diploma of Government (Investigation) for employees contractors primarily engaged in the coordination and conduct of fraud control investigations.
    In addition to appropriate qualifications, a robust internal investigations team should have a good mix of skills and experience. Depending on the needs of the entity an investigations team could include: ex-law enforcement officers; lawyers; intelligence operatives; forensic accountants; Information Technology experts, and subject matter experts for the types of programs and services delivered by the entity (for example, building surveyors, engineers or social workers).

    [46]. Referring matters to the AFP: <www.afp.gov.au/what-we-do/referrals.aspx#initial>.
    [47]. At the time that this Better Practice Guide—Fraud Control in Australian Government Entities—was being prepared and published by the ANAO, the AGIS was being updated to reflect experience since it was issued in 2003. While the references to investigation standards in this Better Practice Guide reflect the essence of the revised AGIS, the Australian Federal Police (AFP) plans to provide the revised AGIS on-line and, if appropriate, to modify the standards from time to time. Given the specialised nature of fraud investigations, entities should consult the AFP’s website to ensure the currency of their overall approach to the investigation of fraud and to inform their investigation activities.
    [48]. Attorney-General’s Department, Australian Government Investigation Standards, AGD, Canberra, September 2003, Chapter 3.
    [49]. Attorney-General’s Department, Australian Government Investigation Standards, AGD, Canberra, September 2003, Chapter 4.







    Tuesday 31 December 2013

    Abuse of Discretion

    A failure to take into proper consideration the facts and law relating to a particular matter; an Arbitrary or unreasonable departure from precedent and settled judicial custom.
    Where a trial court must exercise discretion in deciding a question, it must do so in a way that is not clearly against logic and the evidence. An improvident exercise of discretion is an error of law and grounds for reversing a decision on appeal. It does not, however, necessarily amount to bad faith, intentional wrong, or misconduct by the trial judge.
    For example, the traditional standard of appellate review for evidence-related questions arising during trial is the "abuse of discretion" standard. Most judicial determinations are made based on evidence introduced at legal proceedings. Evidence may consist of oral testimony, written testimony, videotapes and sound recordings, documentary evidence such as exhibits and business records, and a host of other materials, including voice exemplars, handwriting samples, and blood tests.
    Before such materials may be introduced into the record at a legal proceeding, the trial court must determine that they satisfy certain criteria governing the admissibility of evidence. At a minimum, the court must find that the evidence offered is relevant to the legal proceedings. Evidence that bears on a factual or legal issue at stake in a controversy is considered relevant evidence.
    The relevancy of evidence is typically measured by its probative value. Evidence is generally deemed Probative if it has a tendency to make the existence of any material fact more or less probable. Evidence that a murder defendant ate spaghetti on the day of the murder might be relevant at trial if spaghetti sauce was found at the murder scene. Otherwise such evidence would probably be deemed irrelevant and could be excluded from trial if opposing counsel made the proper objection.
    During many civil and criminal trials, judges rule on hundreds of evidentiary objections lodged by both parties. These rulings are normally snap judgments made in the heat of battle. Courts must make these decisions quickly to keep the proceedings moving on schedule. For this reason, judges are given wide latitude in making evidentiary rulings and will not be over-turned on appeal unless the appellate court finds that the trial judge abused his or her discretion.
    For example, in a Negligence case, a state appellate court ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting into evidence a posed accident-scene photograph, even though the photograph depicted a model pedestrian blindly walking into the path of the driver's vehicle with the pedestrian's head pointed straight ahead as if she was totally oblivious to the vehicle and other traffic. Gorman v. Hunt, 19 S.W.3d 662 (Ky. 2000). In upholding the trial court's decision to admit the evidence, the appellate court observed that the photograph was only used to show the pedestrian's position relative to the vehicle at the time of impact and not to blame the pedestrian for being negligent. The appellate court also noted that the lawyer objecting to the photograph's admissibility was free to remind the jury of its limited relevance during cross-examination and closing arguments.
    An appellate court would find that a trial court abused its discretion, however, if it admitted into evidence a photograph without proof that it was authentic. Apter v. Ross, 781 N.E.2d 744 (Ind.App. 2003). A photograph's authenticity may be established by a witness's personal observations that the photograph accurately depicts what it purports to depict at the time the photograph was taken. Ordinarily the photographer who took the picture is in the best position to provide such testimony.

    Further readings

    Cohen, Ruth Bryna. 2000."Superior Court Affirms Non Pros for Failure to Subpoena Own Witness; Trial Court Did not Abuse Discretion in Its Application of Civil Procedure Rule 216." Pennsylvania Law Weekly (October 9).
    Hamblett, Mark. 2001. "Circuit Panel Issues Recusal Guidelines; Says Rakoff Acted Properly In Not Stepping Down." New York Law Journal (February 26).
    Riccardi, Michael A. 2002."Polygraph Evidence OK to Prove Probable Cause, Circuit Judges Say; No Abuse of Discretion in Relying on 'Lie Detector' for Limited Purpose." Pennsylvania Law Weekly (April 29).

    Cross-references

    West's Encyclopedia of American Law, edition 2. Copyright 2008 The Gale Group, Inc. All rights reserved.
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